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THE EQUIFAX BREACH: WHAT WE LEARNED AND  
HOW WE CAN PROTECT CONSUMER DATA 
 
Thomas G. Siracusa Jr.* 
 
I. INTRODUCTION 
 
onsumer credit history reports contain information from three 
different credit reporting agencies (“CRAs”)1: Equifax, Ex-
perian, and Transunion.2 Each CRA collects the same information 
but processes and reports it differently.3 Their primary purpose is 
to research and sell consumers’ credit information to various cred-
itors.4 Consumer information collected consists of identity and pay-
ment information, records of employment, previously requested 
credit history reports by creditors, and public records (such as 
bankruptcies and foreclosures).5 In May 2017, Equifax experienced 
a massive data breach that exposed the sensitive information of ap-
proximately 145 million Americans.6 Information obtained by the 
hackers included full names, birthdates, Social Security numbers, 
credit card numbers, and driver’s license numbers.7 No infor-
mation was released to the public concerning the breach until six 
weeks following the data breach.8  
                                                             
* J.D. Candidate, May 2019, Loyola University Chicago School of Law. 
1 Latoya Irby, Who Are the Major Credit Reporting Agencies?, THE 
BALANCE (Apr. 8, 2018), https://www.thebalance.com/who-are-the-three-ma-
jor-credit-bureaus-960416. 
2 Id. 
3 Id. 
4 Id. 
5 Id. 
6 Seena Gressin, The Equifax Data Breach: What to Do, FEDERAL TRADE 
COMMISSION (Sept. 8, 2017), https://www.con-
sumer.ftc.gov/blog/2017/09/equifax-data-breach-what-do.  
7 Id. 
8 Lily Hay Newman, Equifax Officially Has No Excuse, WIRED (Sept. 14, 
C 
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The Equifax breach (“Breach”) reopened the discussion of 
consumer data protection. Yet, months after learning about the 
data Breach, the government has not implemented new data secu-
rity laws. Data theft is a serious issue. The consequences on con-
sumers include denial of credit and loans, diminished job pro-
spects, higher insurance rates, and even false criminal records.9 
Today, consumers are left to their own credit protection efforts. Af-
ter the data breach, consumers raced to have their files locked, but 
CRAs often responded to these requests with time consuming ob-
stacles or denials.10 CRAs made minimal efforts to mitigate the is-
sue.11 Equifax finally released an application in January 2018 that 
allows consumers to lock (or freeze) and unlock their files for free; 
yet these features were only available once applicants consented to 
terms that allowed Equifax to continue to store and share con-
sumer information with third parties in limited circumstances.12 
Transunion and Experian offered similar services, but required 
consumers to sign a class action waiver or pay $9.99 per month.13 
While CRAs made meager efforts to ramp-up data protection, com-
panies like Equifax continued to face criticism from the security 
community for allowing an easily preventable Breach by ignoring 
warnings of flaws in their security software.14 People also blamed 
the government for the lack of national standards for CRAs with 
respect to monitoring, security protocols, and imposition of penal-
ties.15 
                                                             
2017), https://www.wired.com/story/equifax-breach-no-excuse/. 
9 Bob Sullivan, 9 Surprising Ways Identity Theft Can Hurt You, CREDIT 
(June 13, 2014), http://blog.credit.com/2014/06/surprising-ways-identity-theft-
can-hurt-you-85080/.  
10 Fred O. Williams, 5 months after Equifax Breach, no new data security 
rules, CREDIT CARDS (Feb. 16, 2018), https://www.creditcards.com/credit-card-
news/equifax-breach-no-new-data-security-rules-five-months-later.php#bills. 
11 Id. 
12 Id. 
13 Id. 
14 Newman, supra note 8.  
15 Heidi N. Moore, Why Didn’t Equifax Protect Your Data? Because Cor-
porations Have All the Power, THE WASHINGTON POST (Sept. 21, 2017), 
https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/posteverything/wp/2017/09/21/why-
didnt-equifax-protect-your-data-because-corporations-have-all-the-
power/?utm_term=.6cbdc1cf6595. 
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In addition to shedding light on the security concerns ac-
companying the collection and distribution of consumer credit in-
formation, the Breach exposed the truth about the relationship be-
tween consumers and corporations. CRAs hold a disproportionate 
amount of power, with respect to contractual terms and communi-
cation, over consumers.16 More disturbing is that CRAs, which 
hold vast amounts of data on millions of Americans, often negli-
gently maintain cybersecurity protocols.17 Fortunately, this negli-
gence and operational problems common with many CRAs became 
glaringly obvious due to the Breach and thus did not go unnoticed 
by the government. In September 2017, Senators Elizabeth Warren 
(D-MA) and Brian Schatz (D-HI) introduced the Freedom from 
Equifax Exploitation Act (“FREE”) in an effort to give consumers 
more control over credit and personal information.18 In January 
2018, Senator Warren and Senator Mark Warner (D-VA), intro-
duced the Data Breach Prevention and Compensation Act 
(“DBPC”).19 The objective of the DBPC Act is to initiate height-
ened authority to supervise CRAs and hold them accountable for 
breaches involving consumer data.20 While these bills will not pre-
vent all cases of data theft, they address the key problems associ-
ated with CRAs and provide incentives to adequately protect con-
sumer data.21 
Part II of this Note will provide an overview of the cause of 
the Equifax breach. Part III will discuss the harmful business prac-
tices of CRAs and will highlight the current issues with data secu-
rity and the importance of data protection legislation reform. Fi-
nally, Part IV will cover legislative remedies and include a 
discussion of the FREE Act and DBPC Act, their potential for re-
ducing the risks of future massive data breaches as well as their 
potential shortcomings. 
 
                                                             
16 Id. 
17 Newman, supra note 8. 
18 Freedom from Equifax Exploitation Act, S. 1816, 115th Cong. (2017) 
(hereinafter “FREE Act”).  
19 Data Breach Prevention and Compensation Act, S. 2289, 115th Cong. 
(2018) (hereinafter “DBPC Act”). 
20 Id. 
21 FREE Act, supra note 18; DBPC Act, supra note 19. 
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II. THE EQUIFAX DATA BREACH 
 
The Equifax breach raised the question of whether compa-
nies electronically storing consumer data take adequate security 
measures to protect that data. Equifax confirmed many consum-
ers’ worst fears when they announced in May 2017 that their sys-
tem had been hacked via a web application vulnerability; a vulner-
ability that could have been fixed with a patch that was available 
two months prior to the Breach.22 Equifax’s negligence was further 
evidenced by a statement by The Apache Software Foundation 
(“Apache”), the provider of the computing platform that Equifax 
and many other enterprises used, which warned its users of the sys-
tem’s vulnerability. Apache confirmed that they had also provided 
instructions about protection for the vulnerability in March 2017.23 
Following the Breach, Apache speculated that the March 2017 vul-
nerability was to blame.24 According to Apache, most data breaches 
are caused by failing to update software components that have 
known vulnerabilities.25 Further, a separate security analytics firm 
concluded that Equifax was hacked because the company failed to 
follow Apache’s advice and instruction on protections.26 
To state it plainly, Equifax had two months to take precau-
tions that would have protected the data of 145 million Americans 
but ignored the warnings.27 Researchers concluded it was relatively 
easy to exploit the vulnerability in Equifax’s servers and network 
once discovered.28 The security community questioned why 
Equifax had failed to heed warnings and protect their consumers’ 
data. How could a company with such a high level of cybersecurity 
responsibility allow this to happen? The answer to this question 
traces back to the ways that CRAs, like Equifax, typically have 
treated consumers. 
                                                             
22 Newman, supra note 8. 
23 Id. 
24Id. 
25 René Gielen, Apache Struts Statement on Equifax Security Breach, THE 
APACHE SOFTWARE FOUNDATION BLOG (Sept. 9, 2017), 
https://blogs.apache.org/foundation/entry/apache-struts-statement-on-equifax. 
26 Newman, supra note 8. 
27 Id. 
28 Id. 
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III. CRA’S MISTREATMENT OF CONSUMERS 
 
The CRAs’ consumer-corporate relationship is one-sided 
and ill-defined.29 In fact, the three major CRAs are among the top 
three most complained about companies in America.30 Most of the 
complaints arise due to erroneous credit reports.31 In 2012, the Fed-
eral Trade Commission (“FTC”) conducted a study of credit re-
ports and found that 26% of consumers found at least one error in 
their file and 5% found critical errors that could lead to a denial of 
credit or increased insurance rates.32 Making matters worse, 
Equifax is known to lack a proper customer service infrastruc-
ture.33 Customers calling to fix an issue with their file experience 
long wait times and numerous automated prompts.34 Representa-
tives are reported to be unhelpful and give bureaucratic re-
sponses.35 Some people claim that the process takes weeks before 
their issues are resolved.36 
When the Breach was first announced, customers who sub-
mitted inquiries about their information were met with the same 
unresponsiveness that is typical of Equifax customer service.37 Fur-
thermore, it was this characteristic unresponsiveness that deterred 
many consumers from contacting Equifax following the Breach.38 
                                                             
29 Bobby Allyn, How the Careless Errors of Credit Reporting Agencies are 
Ruining People’s Lives, THE WASHINGTON POST (Sept. 8, 2016), 
https://www.washingtonpost.com/posteverything/wp/2016/09/08/how-the-care-
less-errors-of-credit-reporting-agencies-are-ruining-peoples-
lives/?utm_term=.ffb7d98b7df4/. 
30 2016 CFPB MON. COMP. REP. VOL. 11., https://files.consum-
erfinance.gov/f/documents/201605_cfpb_monthly-complaint-report-vol-11.pdf 
(last visited Apr. 25, 2018).  
31 Allyn, supra note 28. 
32 FTC REPORT TO CONGRESS UNDER SECTION 319 OF THE FAIR AND 
ACCURATE CREDIT TRANSACTIONS ACT OF 2003 1, 26 (2016).  
33 Ron Lieber, ‘Dear Equifax: You’re Fired.’ If Only It Were That Easy, 
N.Y. TIMES (Oct. 6, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/2017/10/06/your-
money/credit-scores/equifax-hack.html. 
34 Id. 
35 Id. 
36 Allyn, supra note 28. 
37 Moore, supra note 15. 
38 Id. 
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In fact, only around 15 million people visited Equifax’s website in 
the wake of the Breach, compared to the 145 million people af-
fected by it.39 It was Equifax’s poor customer service infrastructure 
which kept millions of Americans in the dark and fearing for their 
financial futures.  
Failing to provide customers with quality information fol-
lowing the Breach was not the extent of Equifax’s negligent behav-
ior. Two and a half months elapsed between the company leaning 
about the vulnerability in their system and notifying the public 
about the Breach.40 In addition, two weeks before consumers were 
notified, two top Equifax executives sold millions of dollars’ worth 
of their own company stock.41 Equifax created a website before the 
announcement that was intended to update consumers on the situ-
ation, but directed many people to a fake version, which was sup-
posedly an accident.42 Equifax’s “solution” that followed was to 
create a website that allowed consumers to enter their Social Secu-
rity numbers to determine if their information was compromised.43 
However, the website proved to be another sham that generated 
the same results for everyone.44 Equifax ended their lackluster ef-
forts with the release of the aforementioned file lock application.45 
The Breach exposed the way CRAs take advantage of con-
sumers as intermediaries in nearly all of their financial transac-
tions.46 Our financial system is structured so that consumers are of-
ten at the mercy of financial firms, who unilaterally set the rules.47 
Many people, like in the case of the data breach, are unaware that 
they are in privity with CRAs until something goes wrong.48 The 
file lock options mentioned in Part I that the three CRAs offered 
                                                             
39 Id. 
40 Newman, supra note 8. 
41 Moore, supra note 15. 
42 Id. 
43 Id. 
44 Id. 
45 Williams, supra note 10.  
46 Moore, supra note 15. 
47 Id. 
48 Id. 
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post-Breach, demonstrates that contractual terms for ordinary con-
sumers invariably favor the company.49 Contracts for ordinary con-
sumers are often tailored to prevent negotiation and legal action.50 
Essentially, the contracts serve to eliminate consumer interference 
with the CRAs’ business.51 On the other hand, contracts between 
CRAs and other financial firms or wealthy individuals accommo-
date the latter’s personal concerns.52 The CRAs’ primary concern 
is to profit, so they naturally give more attention to their deep-
pocketed customers like banks, mortgage lenders, and credit card 
companies.53 While CRAs negotiate with their wealthy customers; 
they hang consumers out to dry, making them sign away their 
rights and failing to provide responsive action to protect consumer 
data.54 This negligent behavior needs to be stopped. It is clear that 
CRAs will not police themselves, as market forces do not incentiv-
ize them to do so.55 We need the implementation of laws and regu-
lations to effectuate change. 
 
IV. LEGISLATIVE REMEDIES 
 
Despite being responsible for maintaining the data of hun-
dreds of millions of Americans, CRAs are not federal agencies and 
have no government affiliation. Federal laws, like the Fair Credit 
Reporting Act (“FCRA”) give consumers limited rights to fix inac-
curacies on CRA-generated credit reports and for access to their 
credit histories.56 The bill also imposed identity-theft-notification 
obligations on CRAs.57 Some states, like Illinois, have more strin-
gent laws.58 The Illinois Personal Information Protection Act 
(“IPIP”) requires companies that hold their customers’ personal 
data to have maintainable and reasonable security measures to 
                                                             
49 Williams, supra note 10.  
50 Id. 
51 Moore, supra note 15. 
52 Id. 
53 Id. 
54 Id. 
55 Id. 
56 Fair Credit Reporting Act 15 U.S.C. § 1681 1, 50 (2012). 
57 Id.  
58 815 Ill. Comp. Stat. 530 (2006). 
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protect data from unauthorized access.59 However, these laws were 
not enough to put an end to the negligent behavior of CRAs. The 
U.S. needs to take additional measures, such as uniformity in 
standards that will keep CRAs in check and hold them accountable 
when their data is compromised. 
Thankfully, the Breach attracted government attention. In 
September 2017, the Department of Justice60 and FTC61 announced 
separate investigations of possible corporate malfeasance on the 
part of Equifax executives. However, federal investigations are of-
ten an arduous process and have a reputation for losing the public’s 
attention.62 Another option is to pursue litigation. Litigation has 
been offered to help deter CRAs from poor practices.63 Since the 
Breach, more than thirty lawsuits have been filed against Equifax 
resulting in what has the potential to become the largest class ac-
tion in U.S. history.64 But lawsuits, at best, typically result in grad-
ual progress and, as Part I explained, many consumers have signed 
away their rights to bring CRAs into court.65  
The most effective way to restore consumer rights under 
these circumstances is through federal legislation. Congress re-
sponded to the Breach by the introduction of two bills: the FREE 
Act,66 and the DBPC Act.67 Under these two bills, CRAs like 
Equifax will be required to maintain reasonable cybersecurity pro-
tection standards and response protocols crafted by their regulators 
in the event of a data breach.68 
                                                             
59 Id. 
60 Tom Schoenberg et al, Equifax Stock Sales are the Focus of U.S. Criminal 
Probe, BLOOMBERG (Sept. 18, 2017), https://www.bloomberg.com/news/arti-
cles/2017-09-18/equifax-stock-sales-said-to-be-focus-of-u-s-criminal-probe.  
61 David McLaughlin et al., FTC Opens Investigation into Equifax Breach, 
BLOOMBERG (Sept. 14, 2017), https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2017-
09-14/equifax-scrutiny-widens-as-ftc-opens-investigation-into-breach. 
62 Lily Hay Newman, How to Stop the Next Unstoppable Mega-breach—
Or Slow It Down, WIRED (Sept. 12, 2017), https://www.wired.com/story/how-
to-stop-breaches-equifax/.  
63 Id. 
64 Moore, supra note 15. 
65 Williams, supra note 10. 
66 FREE Act, supra note 18. 
67 DBPC Act, supra note 19. 
68 Id. 
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A. The Freedom from Equifax Exploitation Act 
 
The provisions of the FREE Act require CRAs to offer con-
sumers prompt freezes of their credit files without any fees.69 CRAs 
must send one free credit report to consumers each year70 and offer 
fraud protection alerts.71 Even when files are locked, CRAs sell 
consumer information to companies that seek to target their mar-
keting.72 The FREE Act prohibits CRAs from profiting off of con-
sumer files while they are frozen.73 Finally, the bill mandates that 
fees, which were imposed on consumers to lock their files in the 
wake of the Equifax breach, to be fully refunded.74 
Just as the title suggests, the bill aims to acknowledge and 
penalize the negligent behavior of Equifax and other CRAs in re-
sponse to the Breach. The objective is simple: consumer control 
over their own information. Consumers should not be required to 
pay every time they want to see their personal credit files. People 
should not have to pay to stop CRAs from allowing third parties to 
access their information. Consumers should be able to inquire 
about their files if they are suspicious that an unauthorized user has 
accessed them. CRAs make hundreds of millions of dollars each 
year selling their services to creditors.75 CRAs should not be al-
lowed to continue profiting off of consumer information when they 
are explicitly told not to use it. Finally, CRAs should not profit off 
of something that was their fault to begin with. The bill efficiently 
highlights ways that CRAs wrongfully profit off of consumers and 
sanctions them. CRAs should profit as intermediaries to the extent 
that they share information only when it is necessary for consumer 
                                                             
69 FREE Act, supra note 18, § 4. 
70 Id. § 3. 
71 Id. 
72 Elizabeth Warren, Warren, Schatz Introduce Legislation to Give Control 
of Credit Information Back to Consumers, Protect Personal Data Following 
Equifax Hack, U.S. SENATE (Sept. 15, 2017), https://www.warren.sen-
ate.gov/newsroom/press-releases/warren-schatz-introduce-legislation-to-give-
control-of-credit-information-back-to-consumers-protect-personal-data-follow-
ing-equifax-hack.  
73 FREE Act, supra note 18, § 4. 
74 Id. § 6. 
75 Moore, supra note 15.  
9.Siracusa.docx (Do Not Delete)  5/21/18  2:52 PM 
2018 The Equifax Breach 469 
approval for mortgages, credit cards, or other financial arrange-
ments. 
The FREE Act could create some controversy. The bill pro-
motes seemingly limitless credit freezes.76 Consumer access to 
credit is tantamount to the well-being of the economy.77 If consum-
ers were to take advantage of the free service by continuously lock-
ing their files for prolonged periods of time, it could create issues.78 
For example, lenders rely on credit files to provide assurance that 
the consumers applying for their services will not default on loans.79 
Without giving creditors file access, consumers could find their ac-
cess to credit seriously curtailed, as creditors would feel less confi-
dent in consumers’ ability to make timely payments on bills or 
loans.80 Activities such as purchasing homes and applying for 
health care could become much more arduous.81 The bill should be 
amended to limit the number of times consumers can freeze their 
credit files per year or the duration of the freezes. Alternatively, 
consumers should be wary and make sure that their credit history 
is accessible by appropriate inquiries about their files. During the 
process of protecting consumer data, it is important that consumers 
do not begin to disrupt markets and create disadvantages for busi-
nesses and themselves. 
 
B. The Data Breach Prevention and Compensation Act 
 
The DBPC Act is a more comprehensive, common-sense 
approach to securing consumer data.82 The bill would develop an 
office of cybersecurity and appoint a director at the FTC tasked 
with annual inspections and supervision of cybersecurity at 
CRAs.83 The bill would allow the FTC to impose new data security 
                                                             
76 FREE Act, supra note 18, § 4. 
77 Veronique de Rugy, Warren’s Regulatory Expansion Is Wrong Answer to 
Equifax Breach, REASON (Dec. 21, 2017), http://reason.com/ar-
chives/2017/12/21/warrens-regulatory-expansion-is-wrong-an. 
78 Id. 
79 Id. 
80 Id. 
81 Id. 
82 DBPC Act, supra note 19. 
83 Id. § 3. 
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standards upon CRAs.84 Since CRAs currently face no penalties for 
allowing consumer data to be stolen, the bill would impose strict-
liability penalties for breaches.85 The penalties would begin with a 
base of $100 for each consumer who had one piece of personal in-
formation compromised. An additional $50 for each extra piece of 
compromised information per consumer.86 The penalties are 
capped at 50% of the CRAs’ gross revenue from the prior year.87 
However, in cases where the offending CRA experiences a breach 
and failed to maintain FTC standards or timely notify the FTC of 
a breach, the per-consumer penalties would double and the penalty 
cap would increase to 75% of the CRAs’ gross revenue from the 
prior year.88 Finally, the bill requires the FTC to allocate 50% of its 
collected penalties to compensate consumers and 50% to reinvest 
in the cybersecurity office.89 
If the DBPC Act was in place during the Equifax breach, 
the CRAs would have paid approximately $1.5 billion in fines.90 
The bill aggressively aims to adjust the financial incentives that 
cause CRAs to treat consumers negligently. Putting CRAs under 
the microscope of a governmental regulatory authority would help 
ensure consumers that their interests are being protected in trans-
actions between financial firms. Given CRAs’ current focus on 
profit, the massive and mandatory penalties that threaten CRAs 
for failure to comply with FTC regulations would help maintain 
adequate cybersecurity measures. Compensating consumers after 
data breaches would remind CRAs that their consumers are just as 
important to their business as creditors and there is no incentive to 
treat them negligently. 
The DBPC Act also has some potential shortcomings. The 
                                                             
84 Id. 
85 Id. § 4. 
86 Id. 
87 Id. 
88 Id. 
89 Id. 
90 Elizabeth Warren, Warren, Warner Unveil Legislation to Hold Credit Re-
porting Agencies Like Equifax Accountable for Data Breaches, U.S. SENATE 
(Jan. 10, 2018), https://www.warren.senate.gov/newsroom/press-releases/war-
ren-warner-unveil-legislation-to-hold-credit-reporting-agencies-like-equifax-
accountable-for-data-breaches. 
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first issue is with some of the bill’s language. The bill defines “cov-
ered breach”91 as any instance in which at least one piece of person-
ally identifying information is exposed or is reasonably likely to 
have been exposed to an unauthorized party.92 This language is 
vague. What constitutes the first and additional pieces of infor-
mation? What does “reasonably likely to have been exposed” 
mean? The bill also fails to explain how somebody demonstrates 
their information was reasonably likely to have been exposed. 
Moreover, the bill does not address whether companies, such as 
marketing agencies, who receive data from CRAs without con-
sumer knowledge constitute an unauthorized party.93 If the 
Equifax breach unveiled anything, it is that everyone’s data could 
have already been compromised. That means their information is 
already in the hands of unauthorized parties. These are details that 
need to be clarified in order to create make a more practical piece 
of legislation. We do not want to open the floodgates for numerous 
meritless actions that the bill’s ambiguous language might allow.  
It is unclear how the government would pay each consumer 
their portion of the penalties CRAs would pay in the event of a data 
breach.94 There needs to be more specificity in the plans to identify 
and compensate affected consumers. However, compensating con-
sumers as the bill provides might not be a sufficiently equitable 
remedy in many cases. For example, Sen. Warren estimated that 
under the DBPC Act, Equifax would have had to pay $1.5 million 
in penalties for the breach.95 If 50% of the penalties were allocated 
amongst the approximately 145 million affected consumers, each 
affected consumer would receive roughly $5. This is not an ade-
quate remedy for somebody whose credit was potentially ruined. 
An adequate response to this issue is that the bill’s primary objec-
tive is to prevent data breaches, not punish CRAs or make consum-
ers whole.  
Finally, the DBPC Act should not vest complete regulatory 
                                                             
91 DBPC Act, supra note 19, § 2. 
92 Id. 
93 Moore, supra note 15. 
94 Ron Shevlin, Save Us from the Data Breach Prevention and Compensa-
tion Act, INSIGHT VAULT (Jan. 10, 2018), https://www.crnrstone.com/insight-
vault/2018/01/10/save-us-data-breach-prevention-compensation-act/. 
95 Warren, supra note 88. 
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authority of CRAs in the FTC.96 Cybersecurity is an issue that af-
fects a number of industries, not just those within the scope of the 
FTC’s authority.97 If the government wanted to address subse-
quent cybersecurity issues within other industries, they would have 
to establish more cybersecurity offices within their respective agen-
cies.98 Government agencies are only allowed to regulate industries 
to the extent they fall under the general scope of the human activity 
there are designed to regulate.99 Having multiple cybersecurity reg-
ulators may lead to confusion in determining correct compliance 
standards, and in some instances create regulatory overlap issues100 
Perhaps a better alternative would be to establish an independent 
cybersecurity agency that has authority over all industry cyberse-
curity matters. This would eliminate potential issues with regula-
tory overlap and industry compliance. CRAs’ cybersecurity prac-
tices may require different regulation than, for instance, those of 
internet service providers. Thus, under this arrangement, an inde-
pendent cybersecurity agency would be able to address a wide ar-
ray of human activities and issue standards both uniform and 
unique to particular services. 
 
V. CONCLUSION 
 
The U.S. has a data breach problem and the issue lies with 
CRAs who put profit over people. The Equifax breach was an ex-
ample of how bad things can become for consumers when CRAs 
operate in a manner that exposes consumer data. Federal investi-
gations and lawsuits will not put an end to the negligent behavior 
CRAs engage in on a national scale. Comprehensive legislation set-
ting a uniform standard for how CRAs operate and interact with 
the consumers whose data they harbor is necessary. Despite poten-
                                                             
96 Shevlin, supra note 91. 
97 Id. 
98 Id. 
99 EPA, The Basics of Regulatory Practice, ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION 
AGENCY, https://www.epa.gov/laws-regulations/basics-regulatory-process, (last 
visited Apr. 25, 2018). 
100 Id. 
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tial shortcomings, the FREE and DBPC Acts should allow the gov-
ernment to hinder data thieves from stealing consumer information 
by keeping a watchful eye on CRAs’ business practices, paving the 
way for additional legislative remedies. Neither of the bills have 
been brought to the Senate floor, but each have received multiple 
endorsements from fellow Senators and consumer interest 
groups.101 The U.S. needs to take action sooner rather than later. 
Under the FREE Act, the Senators should consider curtailing the 
amount of times consumers can freeze their credit files. With re-
spect to the DBPC Act, Congress could consider provisions for ex-
tra damages for consumers and creating an independent cyberse-
curity agency to set harmonized cybersecurity standards and avoid 
regulatory confusion. The information that CRAs hold is far too 
sensitive to continue to be poorly safeguarded. 
 
 
                                                             
101 Warren, supra note 88. 
